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economic effectiveness of such organizational forms in the specific spheres 
of activity. In particular artel’s «natural habitat» was quite narrow and was 
confined within activities of low capital investment, simple homogeneous 
job and labor with primitive equipment and technology. Artel in its «pure» 
forms did not survive in other spheres. Principal–agent and team 
production approaches highlight that Russian artel was an effective 
institution for solving adverse selection and moral hazard problems.  
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 Introduction 
Collectivism is often highlighted by scientists as one of the features of 
the Russian national character and mentality. They regard it as an informal, 
embedded institution of the Russian society which should be taken into 
consideration during socio-economic transformations. In this connection, it 
is very important and pressing to find out to what extent collectivism de-
termined, and still determines, the economic behavior of the Russian per-
son. It is of great importance both at the macroeconomic level for develop-
ing an appropriate state-run socio-economic strategy and at the microeco-
nomic level for improving management styles used to run Russian compa-
nies, for working out adequate forms of labor organization and workers’ 
motivation by Russian managers. 
Russian scientists consider artelnost, i.e. a specific propensity for 
working collectively in the economic sphere, as one of the most significant 
manifestations of collectivism. 
The aim of this paper is to find out whether artelnost is in fact a basic 
institution of the Russian society. This issue has been ignored by Russian 
researchers over the last decades remaining simply rhetorical. The paper 
focuses on checking the following hypothesis: the Russian person did not 
have a specific inherent motivating commitment to collective work. The 
existence of artels in Russia was, to a large extent, due to a higher eco-
nomic effectiveness of this organizational form of economic activity in 
some spheres. 
The object of investigation is artel as an institutional form of economic 
activity in Russia in XIX — early XX centuries. Factors which helped ar-
tels come into being and remain relatively stable and common in the his-
toric past, as well as the role of mental models in these processes are the 
subject of this investigation. This study is based on empirical descriptions 
of artels of the second half of XIX century, artels’ charters, statutes relating 
to artels and a wide range of historical literature. In this study principles of 
historical and comparative institutional analysis are used. The main method 
is that of analytic narratives. New Institutional Economics is used as an 
analytical tool; in particular, such parts of it as Economics of Institutions 
and Institutional Change, Historical and Comparative Institutional Analy-
sis, Contract Theory, Alchian–Demsetz’ team production concept, Jensen–
Merckling’s agency costs concept, etc. 
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Unlike investigations which trace influence of cultural beliefs and val-
ues on the institutional environment and institutional arrangements, this 
paper tries to reconstruct cultural beliefs and mental models by means of 
institutions operating at the time. The first part of the paper deals with the 
mental model concept, analyses literature on Russian mentality and on one 
of its features such as collectivism and artelnost. The second part describes 
artel as a form of economic activity in Russia. It lists types of artels and 
they are interpreted both as formal and informal institutions. The third part 
reveals Russian artelnost as a research artefact. The forth part gives evi-
dence that artel can be interpreted as a way of solving team production 
problems: adverse selection and opportunistic behavior. In the fifth part the 
author sums up the results of the investigation and makes conclusions. 
 
Mental models and cultural beliefs 
Many researchers have emphasized a decisive influence of informal 
institutions on economic behaviour and its development. One can name 
among them M. Weber who wrote about the influence of religion, T. We-
blen and J. Commons, representatives of the old American institutionalism, 
modern traditional institutionalists as well as members of the French his-
torical School «Annales» who studied mentality. New Institutional Eco-
nomics scientists treat informal institutions, as a rule, as a given reality. 
That’s why they do not consider them to be the subject of investigation. 
However, they state that a social organization and an institutional pattern 
reflect mental models and cultural beliefs. 
D. North uses the notion of mental models while formulating his ide-
ology concept. He writes that «ideologies are shared frameworks of mental 
models possessed by groups of individuals that provide both an interpreta-
tion of the environment and a prescription as to how that environment 
should be ordered» [North, 1994, p. 363, n. 6]. Denzau and North in their 
paper of 1994 state that in order to understand decision-making processes 
in conditions of great uncertainty it is necessary to find out connection be-
tween mental models created by people to comprehend the surrounding 
world, ideologies brought about by these models and institutions set up in 
the society to regulate interpersonal relationships. 
The notion of cultural beliefs was introduced into the scientific vo-
cabulary by A. Greif. He regards them as common ideas shared by indi-
viduals belonging to a certain group and interacting within the group and 
beyond it. These cultural beliefs provide focus points and coordinating ex-
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pectations. They represent non-technological rules of the game which can 
change endogenously. The existence of institutions of a certain type and 
the emergence of new ones demonstrate the growth of knowledge which 
can result from deliberate projections as well as unpremeditated experi-
ments [Greif, 1994, p. 915]. According to Greif some rules of the game 
could be caused by the existing technologies and, consequently, institutions 
must be regarded as non-technological restrictions which structured recur-
ring interactions between people. 
Mentality as a complex of intellectual habits, beliefs, mental aims 
typical for some community or a group of people, and the state of mind, or 
a complex of behavior, mentality or judgemental patterns, ethical norms, 
the turn of mind represents propensity for acting in a particular way. 
This study stresses the idea that in all approaches to interpret mental 
models and mentality, the latter becomes apparent in motivation, actions, 
economic and communication methods. 
Collectivism as the Russian mentality feature. Modern science cannot 
give a trustworthy prototype of the Russian person. In theoretical works the 
Russian person is quite inconsistent and even contradictory. On the one 
hand, he is unattractive because he tends to be a Utopist, disrespects pri-
vate property and works hard only occasionally. On the other hand, he is 
notable for his spiritual life, aspiration for freedom and independence, he 
regards work as the highest value, strives for justice and equality with the 
aim of serving people and the state. Collectivism is often named by re-
searchers as a typical feature of the Russian national character and mental-
ity. They regard it as an informal, embedded institution of the Russian so-
ciety. These statements go back to the middle of the XIX century when ex-
pectations of achieving rapid results after the Great Reforms were replaced 
by disappointment and, as a consequence of this a new trend in social men-
tality which linked Russia’s future with a specific national way of devel-
opment, was born. It projected a distinctive non-capitalistic way of devel-
opment based on a collectivist principle. Implementation of this principle 
was to be carried out by maintaining and consolidating socio-economic 
forms which, according to researchers, were organically inherent in Russia, 
i.e. communes, cooperatives and artels. V. Vorontsov, a Russian narodnik, 
specified that «our capitalistic manufacturing must be transformed into a 
state or artel production», «our further industrial progress will rest on truly 
people’s principles represented by communes and artels» ([V. V., 1882, 
p. 68, 309]. See also: [V. V., 1895a, 1895b]). 
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Western scientists also actively study problems related to the Russian 
mentality (See [The World of the Russian Peasant…, 1990; Kingston-
Mann E. and Mixter T., 1991; Zviglyanich, 1993; The Russian Mental-
ity…, 1995]). It is almost commonly recognized that commitment to col-
lective work typical for the Russian culture makes it completely different 
from Western cultures.  
O. Figes and G. Hoskins emphasize Russian people’s innate propen-
sity for collective work [Hosking, 1991; Figes, 1996] It is regarded as a 
particularly important feature of the Russian mentality which greatly influ-
ences management styles and practice in Russia [Lawrence, Vlachoutsicos, 
1990, p. 20]. D. Bollinger also insists on the collectivist nature of the Rus-
sian management culture [Bollinger, 1994]. F. Trompenaars has come to 
different conclusions. According to public opinion polls, the level of indi-
vidualism among Russiam managers as well as other employees is ex-
tremely high [Trompenaars, 1993]. 
According to G. Hofstede’s estimations, Russian people’s values are 
only 50% collectivist, whereas the statistical data of a Russian scientist 
who uses Hofstede’s methods show the dominance of collectivist values 
[Naumov, 1996]. In the mid 1990s a survey of 53 countries including Rus-
sia was conducted within the Globe Project framework. According to the 
level of collective value development, Russia ranked 35, and the polled 
managers wished it were higher [Grachev, 1999, p. 30]. 
As it has been emphasized, modern Russian scientists regard Russia’s 
traditional version of collective work as artelnost [Yasin, 2003, p. 18], 
which is most clearly formulated by V. Ryazanov who names «a specific 
propensity for collective work in the economic sphere», which becomes 
apparent in communes and artels among principal sources of Russia’s eco-
nomic system [Ryazanov, 1998, p. 330]. He explains wide spreading of ar-
tel forms by their maximum suitability to the specifics of the country’s 
economic development and by conformity with behavior patterns of the 
population majority [Ryazanov, 1998, p. 344]. That’s why the problem of 
finding out to what extent collective work has affected and still affects 
Russian people’s behavior is very pressing. 
Operationalisation of the artelnost notion. Cultural parameters such as 
individualism or collectivism are quite difficult to formalize, measure and 
express in quantitative terms. Modern assessments of collective work are 
carried out by means of field research on the basis of public opinion polls. 
When we try to assess the past, this approach is impossible. That’s why 
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historical assessments are made, as a rule, when analyzing statements, lit-
erary works, etc. 
In order to make the artelnost notion operational a new institutional 
economics tool will be used in this paper. In accordance with the theory of 
institutions and institutional transformations [Greif, 1994; 1998; Denzau, 
North, 1994] present institutions reflect actors’ cultural beliefs or mental 
models because they form the motivation and incentive basis to set up cer-
tain institutions and, to a large extent, predetermine the formation of ap-
propriate institutions (Figure). Acceptance or rejection of particular institu-
tional types depends on the prevalence of this or that cultural belief. 
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Fig. Mental models and organizational economic forms 
 
Consequently, if artelnost had really been a traditional Russian version 
of collective work, it would have led to the creation of appropriate institu-
tions at all levels of the hierarchy introduced by O. Williamson [William-
son, 2000, p. 596–599]. In informal, embedded institutions it should have 
become apparent as appropriate customs, traditions and norms, while at 
other levels it should have led to a continual spontaneous development of 
appropriate, stable and widely spread labor and economic forms, as well as 
formed the basis of successful institutional engineering, i.e. implementa-
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tion of projected artel labor and economic forms in accordance with these 
traditions by means of different measures including legislative ones. 
Proceeding from the above-stated assumption, the following criteria, 
in our opinion, can be used to measure artelnost: firstly, the extent to which 
artel labor and economic forms spread in all spheres of activity; secondly, 
for the most part spontaneous character of their emergence; and finally, in-
herent commitment to this organizational economic form, i.e. lack of op-
portunistic behavior in artels. 
 
Artel as economic organization 
There were a lot of artel types carrying out different work in Russia: 
• of a spiritual character: religious, entertaining, educational (joint sub-
scriptions to newspapers and books, hire of teachers, etc.) 
• nursing 
• communal 
• of thieves 
• of beggars 
• economic: agricultural, fishing, production, handicraft, trading, build-
ing, etc. 
A special role was played by exchange artels in the XIX century. Their 
members’ duties were diverse. They provided loading and unloading of 
goods at the exchange, packed and dispatched various cargoes, guarded 
warehouses, etc. Besides that, artel members fulfilled other duties for their 
employers: they worked in offices as assistants and errand boys. Some-
times they were given big sums of money to carry because their employers 
trusted them. Quite often they did household chores. As exchange artel 
members were paid by the day and by the piece, this organization could not 
be, in fact, considered as artel, which was officially recognized by the 1823 
Statute [O vzyskanii 40-rublyovoy poshliny…, 1823]. The main focus are 
artels which employed collective work because it is the subject of this 
study. They include labor artels proper (a group of workers offering their 
collective services as builders, diggers, loaders, porters, etc. for pay) and 
production artels of a pure labor type where all workers are owners of the 
plant and the goods they produce, there are no hired workers, the head is 
elected by the workers and can be replaced at any time [Tugan-
Baranovsky, 1989, p. 192]. 
Artel as a formal and informal institution. The word ‘artel’ was used 
in legislative documents for the first time in the middle of the XVII century 
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replacing the word ‘vataga’(crowd). It was formalized as an institutional 
economic form in 1799 in Guilds’ Charter where in Chapter XIV ‘On work 
done by artels’ artel members’ rights and duties were finally defined. Ac-
cording to the definition formulated in Clause 1, «work or a task which is 
beyond one worker’s capabilities can be done by common consent by a 
group of workers, and such groups must be called artels» [Ustav tsekhov, 
1799]. Clause 4 also had some important information on artels. It read that 
«each artel member must be responsible for the incurred damage or losses 
and guarantee payment».  
The artel definition was specified in the 1823 Statute which ran that 
«artel means that each worker is responsible for everybody in artel and the 
whole artel is responsible for each worker, they are paid from a common 
fund (duvan) and work is done collectively» [O vzyskanii 40-rublyovoy 
poshliny…, 1823, art. 4]. The same definitions were used in the Trade 
Charter, and in the XIX-early XX centuries artels were specified as «asso-
ciations of workers set up voluntarily to carry out work or production 
which is beyond one worker’s capabilities» [Ustav torgoviy, 1857, 
Art. 79]. 
Labor artel Statute was passed on June 1, 1902 in which labor artels 
were defined as «partnerships set up to carry out specific work or produc-
tion as well as provide services by participants’ personal involvement at 
their expense by collective guarantee». A similar definition was given in 
the Civil Statute [Zakony grazhdanskiye, 1906, Art. 21981]. 
Labor artels were established in accordance with either existing stat-
utes or agreements. Their charters were submitted to the governor for ap-
proval and published in local newspapers. Any person, male or female, 
over 17 years old could become an artel member. But under-21s had no 
right to participate in management. Artel got an official status if it had 5 
members and its charter did not stipulate a greater number of workers. It 
was managed by the general meeting. Meetings took place only if not less 
than half of the members were present. Every member had one vote. Deci-
sions were made by a majority of votes. More important decisions required 
the presence of 2/3 of its members. Membership fees were the same for 
everybody and could be paid in cash or by things. If sums paid to the cash-
ier exceeded fees, they were considered as loans. Wages were paid to all 
members in accordance with the resolution of the general meeting regard-
less of the sums in each member’s account. Artel used its assets to cover all 
losses and meet liabilities. If artel’s assets were insufficient, its members’ 
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private property was claimed in its entirety or in the amount specified in 
the Charter. 
Regulations on exchange artels were passed on June 16, 1905. They 
were similar to the Labor Artel Statute. In accordance with Clause 1, «ex-
change artels aim at carrying out work related to acceptance, dispatch and 
storage of goods as well as fulfilling office tasks and trading with organiza-
tions and individuals» [O pravilakh dlya birzhevykh arteley…, 1905]. Ex-
change artels could function only in accordance with the charter which was 
approved by the Exchange Committees. Thus, exchange artels’ activities 
were based on clearly defined rules, meeting of liabilities being guaranteed 
collectively by the insurance policy.  
All chartered artels enjoyed the rights of entities, i.e. they could buy 
assets, sign agreements, sue and be sued, set up or take on lease industrial 
or trade facilities. Thus, the most important features of artels in Russia 
were as follows: 
• voluntary membership; 
• personal involvement in artel’s activities binding for all members; 
• collective guarantee, i.e. all members shared responsibility for the 
damage and losses. 
Besides that, amendments to the 1823 Guilds Charter stated that any-
one wishing to be an artel member must pay an admittance fee. These for-
mal principles of managing artel’s activities supported by the legislation, 
strengthened the rules used by artels at the time and which were full of 
generalities. The only thing regularly highlighted by various state decrees 
on objects of management was the necessity of each member to carry re-
sponsibility for artel. 
As far as artels’ structure, relationships  among members, their con-
tracts and agreements are concerned, there was hardly any legislation on 
that, and artels’ charters differed significantly from each other. That’s why 
formal principles were supplemented with informal, widely spread proce-
dures spontaneously formed over artels’ long history. These principles in-
clude taking decisions by a vote at the general meeting, electing manage-
ment, equality in profit sharing for the same labor input. Admittance crite-
ria were also similar. The following things were taken into consideration: 
• gender; 
• place of residence; 
• age; 
• physical strength; 
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• skills; 
• property status; 
• no other jobs; 
• moral qualities (soberness was valued most highly). 
These criteria were to provide artel members with work on equal terms in 
return for their commitment to work in artel’s interests. Honest work was 
also guaranteed by: 
• admittance fee; 
• references (until the admittance fee is fully paid); 
• tests; 
• trial period; 
• penalties; 
• risk of expulsion from artel; 
• collective guarantee. 
 
Russian artelnost as an artefact of investigation 
Here’s a question to consider. Did the Russian person really have 
some innate propensity for collective work and give priority to public goals 
over his own? Modern statements about Russian artelnost based on the 
conclusions of the past seem to be mainly rhetorical. Proverbs and sayings 
are very good examples of both people’s beliefs and mentality. Proverbs 
and sayings collected by V. Dal do not make it possible to give a simple 
answer to the question whether the Russian person was a collectivist. On 
the one hand, we find out that the «surrounding world» (commune, artel), 
as seen by the people, is an omnipotent independent subject. On the other 
hand, it is sometimes described in negative words. 
A lot of modern scientists insist that artels as economic forms were 
common in Russia, B. Mirinov being one of them. He writes that «besides 
communes in rural and suburban areas, they [peasants] developed a kin-
dred organizational form, artel, which we see in every place where people 
are involved in specific activities beyond peasants’ and settlement com-
munes» [Mironov, 2003, V. 1, p. 525–526]. 
But a thorough study of facts makes it possible to conclude that collec-
tive labor forms, including artels, were not so common as they are some-
times described. Deliberate introduction of labor artels required much time, 
effort and investments from those who tried to do it. 
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Despite the fact that at the beginning of the XX century Russia wit-
nessed a significant growth in the number of cooperatives (there were 1625 
cooperatives in 1901–1902, by January 1, 1917 their number had amounted 
to 47 187 uniting 14 mln households or 84 mln people), M. Tugan-
Baranovsky thinks that «these figures shouldn’t exaggerate the role of Rus-
sian cooperatives». The fundamental difference of the Russian cooperative 
from West-European is that the latter «came into being without any assis-
tance from the state. It was not the state which created cooperatives in the 
West, although it supported the cooperative movement. Our cooperatives 
which were mainly based on loans were entirely propagated by the state, 
and very few of them were true cooperatives in their content» [Tugan-
Baranovsky, 1989, p. 297]. 
Two artel types were common and successful in Russia, i.e. butter 
manufacturing and exchange ones. These artel types are often referred to 
when proving that artelnost is inherent in the Russian national character. 
Let’s consider each type in detail. 
There were 51 butter manufacturing artels in Russia in 1901, in 1917 
their number was 3000.They were not of a labor type though, because 
hired workers were engaged in butter manufacturing. Small milk producers 
owned these artels, managed the manufacturing process personally and col-
laborated with other owners only when selling milk. Consequently, a butter 
manufacturing artel is a selling cooperative, a processing partnership. The 
butter belonged not to the producers but to the milk suppliers. Profits were 
divided in proportion to the supplied milk, not by shares [Tugan-
Baranovsky, 1989, p. 102]. Such artels emerged in Russia in late 1860s. 
They were initiated by N. Vereshchagin, a gentleman by birth, who bor-
rowed the idea from Switzerland and had been introducing it actively in 
Russia since 1865 [See a series of articles: Vereshchagin, 1999]. The first 
artels didn’t live long. One of the reasons of their failure was that peasants 
were not prepared for them. They gave no credence to this economic form. 
Their attitude to innovations was that of opposition. That’s why Veresh-
chagin made every effort to convince them of advantages of dairying ar-
tels. Butter and cheese manufacturing artels started springing up again only 
in late 1890s and became common only when peasants came to understand 
that it was a paying business, and it had advantages over other forms, in-
cluding capitalistic. It has already been mentioned that exchange artels 
were not artels in their true sense. 
As far as labor artels which used collective work are concerned, they 
became common only in the spheres of activity which didn’t require big 
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investments, complicated machinery, where work was homogeneous and 
could be divided into equal parts and done by individual workers, in other 
words, where people simply cooperated to do a job. Artels were mainly 
formed to produce goods in the absence of expensive machinery and great 
technical expertise [Yarotsky, 1898, p. 22]. N. Kalachev described artel as 
part of the common people’s life and relationships [Kalachev, 1999, 
p. 308]. 
Production artels of a pure labor type were very rare. Great Britain had 
only one artel of this type in 1916, whereas Germany had none. There were 
about a hundred small artels in France due to the support from the govern-
ment bodies, public institutions or individuals. Only big Italian agricultural 
artels achieved success without any support. But their aim was to fight un-
employment, and their members had more than one job. In Russia, labor 
artels didn’t become common either. According to I. Sapozhnikov, there 
were only 16 artels in Moscow in 1908, 60 in 1909, and about 115 by 
1916. However, none of them developed into a big enterprise. They were 
small workshops which either died or turned into small capitalist enter-
prises [Sapozhnikov, 1916, p. 14]. Sapozhnikov thinks that shortage of 
working capital and mainly absence of organizational, technical and insti-
tutional support caused the failure of those artels. 
As far as agricultural artels are concerned, of all types of cooperation 
peasants could form, these were the rarest. As it is written in one of the 
early XX century articles on agricultural artels, «at present we have not 
more than a few dozens of big agricultural artels in Russia which would 
buy or rent land collectively with a view to working jointly on it» 
[Gorovaya, 1916, p. 8–9]. This phenomenon was caused, according to 
Gorovaya, by two things. Firstly, artel members often had to give up habits 
and propensities acquired in childhood and inherited from the previous 
generations. They had to conform to the actions and desires of their fellow-
workers, but neither household possession nor the compulsive order in the 
commune taught peasants to be compliant. «Sometimes they champion 
their interests passionately but at other times they submit to the decision 
made by the majority of artel members out of necessity» [Gorovaya, 1916, 
p. 6]. Secondly, differences in peasants’ property status, capacity for work 
and intellectual faculties hampered artels’ activities.  
Agricultural artels’ existence, like that of butter manufacturing ones, 
was mainly due to enthusiasts’ activities. It was Nikolai Levitsky who or-
ganized the first agricultural artel in Russia in 1896 and who was called 
‘artel’s batko’ (ideological leader) by peasants. On the other hand he 
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pointed out that labor artels in general and production artels in particular 
were the most difficult types of cooperation to put into practice. «It is not 
an easy task. It requires that peasants have plenty of stamina, developed 
self-consciousness and great initiative» [Levitsky, 1916, p. 4]. He pointed 
out that the society rejected this form of production organization, that «ar-
tels were the most neglected form of cooperation» unlike consumer, credit 
or loan-saving societies which were under the patronage of the community, 
zemstvo or state. 
Only one big production artel lived long in Russia and proved to be 
viable. It was a knife-producing artel in the village of Pavlovo which was 
set up in 1893 and supported by individuals, public institutions and the 
state. However, Pavlovo artel gave so few benefits to its members that 
hired workers did not want to join it [Tugan-Baranovsky, 1989, p. 207]. 
These facts prove once again that Russian people did not have any 
special propensity for working in artels as a way to meet their needs to 
work communally, and that the main reason for joining them was of eco-
nomic nature. Collective work was only a means which enabled people to 
make money in initial conditions and types of jobs. 
In practice, production artels operating both abroad and in Russia were 
either ineffective or turned into capitalist enterprises, which is demon-
strated quite convincingly in one of the articles of the late XIX century 
[P-r, 1897]. Many researchers pointed out that a lot of artels which origi-
nally were workers’ unions turned into entrepreneurs’ unions. Hands were 
hired to do work, whereas artel members managed them and gained profits. 
Thus, the very essence of artel as a workers’ union was destroyed. In this 
connection, wage labor in artels was restricted by law. Artels’ charters had 
to stipulate terms and the procedure of employment as well as the number 
of hired workers. Hired workers were allowed to work in artels only on a 
temporary basis in exceptional cases. 
Opportunistic behavior in artels. Opportunistic behavior, according to 
the definition given by O. Williamson, implies pursuing one’s own goals, 
sometimes perfidiously and unethically, which interfere with an institu-
tion’s interests [Williamson, 1996, p. 689]. Postcontracting opportunism 
becomes apparent in the form of shirking, extorting and blackmailing. 
Consequently, opportunistic behavior can testify to disregard of collective 
interests. Discipline (labor, technological, economic, etc.) is crucial in co-
operation. Was there any discipline in artels? Unfortunately, it is impossi-
ble to estimate the actual scale of opportunistic behavior in artels. 
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For example, there were no special penal books in exchange artels to 
protect artel’s reputation. When the year was over, and all payments made, 
artel’s financial books were destroyed making it impossible to see whether 
any member had been fined or not [Kalachev, 1999, p. 322]. However, the 
destruction of the books in itself testifies to the problem of improper atti-
tude to work. Embezzlement was the main problem in artels’ activities. 
Newspapers of the early XX century were full of embezzlement facts, mis-
appropriated sums amounting to 200,000 roubles, which was a huge 
amount at the time. That’s why one of the reports made at the first all-
Russia convention of exchange artel representatives was on reinforcement 
of responsibility for embezzlement [Vserossiysky s'ezd predstaviteley …, 
1912]. 
Opportunistic behavior was common practice in artels. In his paper on 
artel development in Russia, G. Petrov points out that attempts to make ar-
tels common failed. They failed to overcome negative features inherent in 
other forms of cooperation. Minutes of general meetings mentioned quar-
rels, envy and favoritism, lack of self-consciousness and self-discipline, 
and poor attendance at meetings. Because of that, management had to ei-
ther impose penalties or pay for attending meetings. Not all artel members 
worked for it. Plenty of them used artel’s raw materials for work some-
where else, sometimes for artel’s competitors [Petrov, 1917, p. 66–67]. 
In butter-manufacturing artels members spoilt milk by adding water, 
some other substances, by no keeping within technological processes. Even 
such an adept artel’s advocate as M. Slobozhanin stated that artels’ reality 
was a far cry from their ideals. These ideals embodied «people’s aspira-
tions for a better financial standing, freedom, equality, democracy, con-
sciousness, dignity, friendship, fraternity, etc.» [Slobozhanin, 1919, p. 14]. 
To sum up, we would like to quote M. Tugan-Baranovsky who said 
that despite all profuse talk about Russian people’s unusual propensity for 
working collectively, enthusiasm for associations and artels had no roots in 
Russia, and that’s why it brought no fruitful results. General praising of ar-
tels did not result in creating a single, stable artel and did not lead to the 
emergence of a cooperative movement somewhat similar to that in Europe. 
The individualistic West with its different political systems turned out to be 
more tailored to accept artel principles than communal Russia [Tugan-
Baranovsky, 1997, p. 495–496; 498–499]. Nevertheless, the question why 
labor artels were common in Russia, is still open. Labor artels, as an insti-
tutional form, seem to have been a good way of solving a classical team-
work problems and enabled to considerably cut agency costs. 
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Labor artels as team production 
Work in artels can be considered as teamwork. A team is a group of 
individuals with common aims who divide work among themselves and 
carry responsibility for achieving certain results. Team members are inter-
dependent because to achieve common aims they need the results of the 
work done by their fellow-workers. The team’s main difference from tradi-
tional formal work groups is synergy effect (i.e. total amount of work done 
by the team exceeds the sum of their individual work). Teamwork is 
widely used at present. Teams are formed when it is economically benefi-
cial, regardless of which culture, collective or individualist, prevails in the 
society. 
Using D. McIntoch-Fletcher’s team criteria we can classify artel as an 
intact team type in contrast to a cross-functional one. An intact team is usu-
ally a production unit or a long-standing group of workers producing a cer-
tain product or service. It can have a leader who is not a team member, and 
whose duty is to coordinate work and secure order. In other cases the team 
can have a leader from within. In some cases team members can play the 
leading role in turn. D. McIntoch-Fletcher points out that quite developed 
mature autonomous intact teams can operate as small enterprises 
[McIntoch-Fletcher, 1996]. 
There are four team types according to their aims: 
• consultative (dealing with management) 
• production (teams of production workers, miners, repairmen, etc.) 
• project (research and planning groups, etc.) 
• action (sport teams, for example). 
From this point of view, artel can be defined as a production team. 
The problem of teamwork production and methods of monitoring it 
was analyzed in a well-known article by A. A. Alchian and H. Demsetz 
[Alchian and Demsetz, 1972]. Teamwork entails big transaction costs: or-
ganizational, of monitoring, disciplining, assessing each member’s contri-
bution to the production output. «Team production will be relied upon… if 
there is a net increase in productivity available by team production, net of 
the meteriong cost associated with disciplining the team» [Alchian and 
Demsetz, 1972, p. 780]. 
Alchian–Demsetz’ study was a starting point for a number of articles, 
including an article by M. C. Jensen and W. H. Meckling [Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976, p. 308] in which they introduce the notion of agency 
costs. According to them, in most agency relationships the principal and 
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the agent incur positive costs of monitoring as well as bonding costs in a 
monetary or non-monetary form.  
Besides, there are the principal’s residual losses as a result of discrep-
ancies between the agent’s solutions and the solutions that could have 
maximized the principal’s financial standing [Jensen and Meckling, 1976, 
p. 308]. 
In his paper ‘Teamwork and moral hazard’, B. Holmstrom demon-
strated that the free rider problem could be solved to a great extent if own-
ership had been at least partially separated from the workers, which gives 
priority to capitalist firms over partnerships. Labor contribution rating sys-
tem can help to overcome a moral hazard threat because it divides risks in 
a more favorable way. 
Of great importance are the following questions: 
• whether the agents can come to a mutual agreement while using this 
work assessment method; 
• what monitoring methods are used; 
• how the output is divided among team members, including the subject 
of monitoring, in order to work out the most effective incentives for 
work [Holmstrom, 1982, p. 338–339]. 
The structure of principal–agent relationships in artels was quite com-
plicated. On the one hand, the owner who hired artel workers to do a job, 
played the role of the principal while artel was an aggregate agent. At the 
same time the owner often signed agreements with individual artel mem-
bers when, for example, he hired them himself, as it was in barge hauling 
artels, or if he employed them to do some household chores, which was 
common practice in exchange artels. On the other hand, artel itself served 
as the principal towards artel members, but at the same time they jointly 
controlled artel activities because important decisions were made at the 
general meeting. 
Labor artels had quite successful mechanisms of lowering different 
transaction costs resulting from team production: 
• by calculating (or measuring) productivity and remuneration; 
• by preventing possible opportunism; 
• by solving a free rider problem when one member’s shirking affects 
the rest of the team. 
Prevention of opportunist behavior in artels. Admittance criteria, such 
as a property status, moral qualities of a member-to-be and an admittance 
fee which was, as a rule, quite high, were preventive measures against op-
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portunist behavior before signing a contract with the worker — screening 
mechanisms. For example, admittance depended on «paying, on average, 
up to 1,000silver roubles [Kalachev, 1999, p. 320, 324]. Thus, to become a 
member of Metelkin artel at St.Petersburg’s Marine Exchange, a candidate 
had to pay a fee of 900 roubles to artel in 1812, 200 roubles paid at the 
time of joining it [Kalachev, 1999, p. 350]. In Moscow in the middle of 
XIX century amounted to 1,000–1,300 silver roubles [Kalachev, 1999, 
p. 324]. At that time it was a huge amount of money which could be earned 
only by a hard working person with entrepreneurial skills. The fact of hav-
ing this sum signalled that the candidate had all the necessary qualities. 
The problem of dealing with false information about candidates was par-
tially solved by finding out the truth in the neighborhood where they lived 
because they had to give information on the place of residence. References 
also played an important role. Thus, candidates were, to some extent, 
screened because of admittance criteria. Besides being a signal, the admit-
tance fee, according to Jensen–Meckling’s terminology, played the role of 
bonding costs, as the member who was about to be expelled from artel be-
cause of his inadequate behavior, lost a part or the whole sum of the collat-
eral.  
Collective guarantee was a powerful factor which undoubtedly made 
postcontractual opportunist behavior less probable.* But it could not pre-
vent it completely. That’s why artel members were paid accordingly: they 
could be punished for their demerits in accordance with artel rules or reso-
lutions passed at the general meeting. The inflicted punishments included 
fines, corporal punishment, removal from work and even expulsion. The 
list of demerits and the size of fines varied in different artels. For example, 
in Metelkin artel which was mentioned above, a member had to pay a 
5-rouble fine for being absent from work, for abusing other members, for 
not being as hard working as them, or being drunk at work. If a member 
                                                 
* Grameen bank set up in Bangladesh by a 2006 Noble Prize winner, Muhhamad Unus, 
is a good modern example of giving out loans, taking into account collective guarantee 
as a tool to solve the problem of adverse selection and prevent agents’ opportunism. 
The bank specializes in giving small loans. Their principles are: no collateral; consecu-
tive crediting; loans to women (6 mln women have taken loans from this bank). At the 
early stages the bank used to give loans only to groups of people using their collective 
guarantee to return the money to the bank. By doing that, they solved the problem of 
asymmetric information between the lender and the borrowers, and could expect loans 
to be taken only for feasible projects. It was understood that one borrower’s default 
would make the other borrowers’ loans impossible. 
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had an additional job without having let artel know about it, he had to pay 
25 roubles [Kalachev, 1999, p. 350]. One of artels in 1810 had a rule of 
imposing a big fine on a member causing trouble between the employer (or 
‘master’ as members of artel called him) and the members [Kalachev, 
1999, p. 349]. Some artel charters ordered its members to inform on their 
fellow-workers if they misbehaved. If they did not do that, they were also 
severely punished. Such practice seemed to be common because this type 
of mutual monitoring considerably lowered costs related to it. 
One of the ways of fighting shirking suggested by Alchian and Dem-
setz involves selecting of a special subject who monitors the team’s per-
formance. However, the problem is that the subject can shirk himself. 
There was a controller in each artel (starosta (headman), desyatnik (charge-
hand), ataman) who besides getting his share of pay, as a rule, was paid 
some extra money as a bonus for his work, but was fined if he misbehaved. 
Thus, exchange artels were run by persons, either selected from within 
who did it in turn, or elected at the general meeting. The “manager”, staro-
sta, was usually elected for a one-year period. If he coped with his duties 
well, he could be re-elected for a new term. His duties included securing 
artel’s money, assigning tasks to members, checking their completion, im-
posing petty fines. The elected starosta was specially remunerated for his 
work whereas the person who played this role in turn, did not get any extra 
pay for that. 
Fishing and hunting artels always had a head who was paid 4 to 7 
times more than an ordinary member. Barge hauling artels paid equally to 
all members including the elected desyatnik for their work but he was paid 
a special remuneration for additional duties. 
Thus, artel can be defined as a coalition of agents with a revolving 
leadership structure where agents participated in profit making as well as 
took turns in playing the role of the principal. Rotation of agents in the 
principal position with the authority delegated to them to control the other 
members’ actions resulted in exchanging reliable information, creating the 
necessary prerequisites for strengthening trustworthy relationships among 
agents and developing cooperation, which in turn led to creating an «asso-
ciative atmosphere» within the organization which prevented opportunist 
behavior and maximized feasibility [Williamson, 1975, p. 38, 44]. Personal 
or collective contracts with an employer served as an additional protection 
from opportunism in artels, e.g. there were detailed laws regulating rela-
tionships among barge haulers and ship owners. Thus, conflicts could be 
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settled both unofficially and in court, shipping and arbitrary courts being in 
charge of that. 
Measurement cost cuts in artels. Payment for work done by artel 
members was made in accordance with the capital or effort contributed by 
each of them. Profits were usually divided equally among the members, 
fines being deducted after that. Sometimes the amount of labor input, on 
rarer occasions the level of expertise, were taken into account to calculate 
workers’ pay. Measuring of individual input entailed transaction costs. 
Cutting of these costs was mainly achieved by setting up artels to carry out 
simple one-type jobs. Work could be either divided into quantitatively 
equal parts and assigned to separate workers, as it was done for loading 
and unloading, digging, mowing, forest cutting jobs, or it simply required 
joint effort, as in barge hauling.  
Another important thing was that labor, as a production factor, was 
relatively homogeneous because physical strength and skills were taken 
into account when hiring artel members. This team formation principle was 
common everywhere. According to A. Engelgardt, «peasants do not agree 
to mow collectively by forming a line. It is possible only when artel is 
formed by 4–5 workers with similar capabilities» [Engelgardt, 1995, 
p. 146].  
Effectiveness problems in artels. Researchers of XIX — early XX cen-
turies highlighted some reasons why production artels did not succeed: 
• lack of discipline among artel members; 
• the employer’s absence and the elected leader’s weak authority with 
the result that his decisions are ignored, with workers putting their in-
terests first; 
• the leader selected from within, as a rule, does not have enough exper-
tise and management skills; 
• workers’ technical backwardness, weak propensity for innovations and 
implementation of modern technology; workers do not tend to use new 
production methods; 
• no freedom in selecting staff. Staff consists only of artel members. A 
new member represents a threat to the benefits which artel has due to 
its old members’ effort .That’s why, if artel is successful, introduction 
of new members leads to old members’ losing part of their benefits 
[Tugan-Baranovsky, 1989, p. 196]. 
E. Fama and M. Jensen put forward a question of how to divide among 
agents such functions as: 1. decision management (decision initiation and 
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implementation); 2. decision control (decision ratification and monitoring) 
3. carrying a residual risk in order to be economically effective. 
According to them, it is reasonable to make one or several agents in a 
simple organization responsible for these functions because if the number 
of candidates for the retained profits is great, their participation in decision 
control entails considerable costs. The above-mentioned functions were not 
separated in artels. Because of collective guarantee, all members carried 
risk equally, i.e. were responsible for the damage and losses. They, in fact, 
signed a share contract which stipulated equal rights for retained profits 
and made collective decisions at general meetings. The functions of carry-
ing risk and  making decisions lowered the profits, but they were compen-
sated by cutting measurement costs and less opportunism. 
  
Concluding remarks 
The following conclusions can be drawn: 
1. Specific features of the Russian national character and culture did not 
cause the emergence of artel as an institutional economic and labor 
form. 
2. Manufacturing artels in Russia were not common. They did not live 
long. A lot of XIX — early XX century researchers considered long-
term cooperation of producers and artels completely unpractical in Rus-
sia. Even those who believed in their future stressed the necessity of co-
ercing people who worked by themselves into these economic organiza-
tions. It was also important that the government, zemstva, and individ-
ual sponsors should support them. The researchers involuntarily pointed 
out that they were of contradictory character.  
3. Labor artels were mainly confined within activities of low capital in-
vestment and uncomplicated machinery. Work was homogeneous and 
the job could be divided into quantitatively equal parts.  
4. Practically, the only asset used to carry out simple homogeneous work 
was workers’ human capital, which could lead to extra opportunist be-
havior. That’s why artel as a contract-based institutional type came into 
being to control it.  
5. In the framework of New Institutional Economics, artel as an economic 
organization can be interpreted as a way of solving team production 
problems. The behavior of artels’ members was rational and quite indi-
vidualistic. 
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